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Helen Clark
In this lecture I will:
•	 comment	on	some	of	the	complex	challenges	of	the	21st	
century	which	cry	out	for	effective	global	governance	
reflecting	today’s	geopolitical	and	other	realities;	and	
•	 examine	whether	global	governance	institutions	–	
particularly	in	the	areas	of	peace	and	security,	economic	
governance,	sustainable	development	and	climate	change	
–	have	kept	up	with	geopolitical	changes	and	been	able	
to	tackle	emerging	challenges	to	ensure	their	continued	
effectiveness,	legitimacy	and	accountability.
Improving Global 
Governance  
making global institutions  
fit-for-purpose in  
the 21st  
century
My working definition of global 
governance will be that of Lawrence 
Finkelstein, former professor of political 
science at Northern Illinois University 
and former vice-president of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. 
Writing in the first issue of the journal 
Global Governance, he suggested that 
global governance could be defined as 
‘governing, without sovereign authority, 
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relationships that transcend national 
frontiers. Global governance is doing 
internationally what governments do at 
home’ (Finkelstein, 1995).
Finkelstein suggested that use of the 
term global, rather than intergovernmental 
or transnational, enables discussion to 
embrace consideration of the roles of 
both traditional state actors and non-
governmental actors. The latter category 
can include global NGO and civil society 
networks, the private sector, academic 
and research institutions, and the 
philanthropic foundations, all of which 
play a role in advocacy around global 
issues and in proposing solutions to 
cross-border challenges. 
Finkelstein wrote of governance 
as an activity which includes not only 
setting rules and regulations, but also 
influencing behaviour through the 
promulgation of principles and norms, 
the exchange of information and the 
provision of assistance. He noted that: ‘If 
we need to institutionalize it, we must say 
the institution in question is a means of 
governance, a governance organization 
or agency, or an actor in governance.’ The 
United Nations plays a very significant 
role in these respects through the large 
body of treaties, conventions and review 
mechanisms for which its individual 
organisations are responsible.
Complex challenges requiring effective global 
governance
At the turn of this century, world leaders 
met in New York for the Millennium 
Summit. They pledged their continued 
faith in the United Nations, noting that: 
‘We reaffirm our commitment to the 
purposes and principles of the charter of 
the United Nations, which have proved 
timeless and universal. Indeed, their 
relevance and capacity to inspire have 
increased, as nations and peoples have 
become increasingly interconnected and 
interdependent.’
Indeed, we do live in an era of 
unprecedented globalisation and 
interdependence, where global public 
goods cannot be secured and protected 
by any one nation alone, and where 
emerging threats and challenges require 
coordinated responses. The United 
Nations Millennium Declaration of 
2000 acknowledged that a central 
challenge of this century is to ensure that 
globalisation becomes a positive force for 
all the world’s peoples. Now, four years 
after the beginning of the global financial 
crisis, the risks posed by the way in which 
economic and financial integration has 
proceeded are clear for all to see. 
At the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) we are acutely 
aware of how a crisis generated in 
the markets of the north spread to all 
corners of the earth, affecting the poorest 
and most distant nations, which saw 
weaker demand and lower prices for 
their exports, higher volatility in capital 
flows and commodity prices, and lower 
remittances. Greater global financial 
stability is unlikely to be achieved in the 
absence of more coordination of financial 
regulation and oversight.
We see many other trans-border 
challenges too which require stepped-up 
global responses – from global warming 
to the spread of pandemics, cyber-war 
and transnational crime, trade barriers 
and the flow of refugees and other 
migrants. All these challenges tend to hit 
those who have the least power and voice 
to influence solutions, the hardest. For 
example:
• Least-developed countries and small 
island developing states have done 
the least to cause climate change, 
and can least afford the costs of 
adaptation to and mitigation of 
it, but they are most at risk from 
increased climate volatility. 
• The poorest countries also bear the 
brunt of the stalemate in the World 
Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Doha 
Round. They have the most to gain 
from accessing currently protected 
markets, and they have fewer – if 
any – cards to play in bilateral trade 
negotiations. 
• Transnational crime, particularly 
trafficking in persons, affects poor 
women and girls the most, yet 
women are heavily under-represented 
in border control, police and 
prosecution structures. 
As the challenges requiring global 
responses have expanded, so too has 
the range of state and non-state actors 
seeking influence on global decisions. 
The rise of the large emerging 
economies is of particular significance, 
as their economic power and reach 
provides a firm foundation for greater 
geopolitical reach. The managing director 
of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Christine Lagarde, commenting 
at the 2012 annual meeting of the IMF 
and World Bank Group in Tokyo on the 
economic aspects of these trends, noted 
that: ‘Economic power is spreading from 
west to east, and prosperity has begun to 
move from north to south.’ The evidence 
of this shift of economic power is clear:
• According to the IMF, in 2007 
emerging markets accounted for 25% 
of GDP and 17% of world debt. By 
2016 they are expected to produce 
38% of world output and account for 
14% of world debt. 
• United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
analysis shows south-south trade 
increasing dramatically, growing on 
average by 12% per year from 1996 
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to 2009, which is 50% faster than the 
growth in north-south trade, and 
now accounting for 20% of global 
trade.
• Countries of the south also 
dramatically increased their share 
of global inward foreign direct 
investment, from 20% to 50% of the 
total between 1980 and 2010.
The UNDP’s next Human Development 
Report examines the rise of the south 
and the implications of that for human 
development. For example, alongside the 
growth in the size of developing-country 
economies there is significant growth in 
south-south development cooperation – 
not only in the form of grants, technical 
assistance and loans, but also through the 
exchange of knowledge, innovation and 
best practice.
In a recent paper, however, Professor 
Robert Wade of the London School 
of Economics issues a warning that 
the world may be moving towards 
‘multipolarity without multilateralism’, 
as ‘economic weight and influence in 
governance are different things’, and 
that established states may not wish 
to compromise with newcomers – and 
vice-versa (Wade, 2011, p.349) Without 
stronger and more representative global 
governance institutions, emerging powers 
may look increasingly to pursue their 
interests through alternative – regional, 
bilateral or unilateral – mechanisms. 
Calls for reform of international 
institutions generally highlight the 
inconsistency between the current 
structures, which reflect the economic 
and political realities at the end of World 
War II, and the vastly different realities 
of today. So, how are global governance 
institutions performing currently, and 
what needs to change? 
Ensuring global governance institutions are 
fit-for-purpose in the 21st century
It is not difficult to draw up an inventory 
of global institutions and mechanisms 
struggling to reach decisions:
• The veto power in the United 
Nations Security Council can be a 
block to decisive action.
• The annual meetings of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) 
to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change have 
often struggled to reach agreement. 
• The UN Commission on the Status 
of Women failed to produce an 
agreed outcome this year.
• The Commission on Sustainable 
Development ended its 19th session, 
in May 2011, unable to agree on 
policy decisions on practical 
measures to advance chemical and 
waste management, transform 
transport and mining practices, 
and establish a long-awaited 10-
year framework of programmes 
for sustainable consumption and 
production patterns.
• The Rio+20 UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development reached 
a consensus among member states 
which fell well short of the level of 
ambition hoped for by those who 
want to see decisive action. 
• Negotiations in New York on the 
outcome document for the fourth 
UN Conference on Least Developed 
Countries, LDC-IV, last year failed to 
reach agreement, and required late 
night compromise to be reached in 
Istanbul. 
• The WTO Doha Development Round 
launched in 2001 is stuck.
• Negotiations on the declaration of 
UNCTAD XIII, the quadrennial 
UNCTAD conference, which was 
held in Doha in April this year, 
appear to have been particularly 
acrimonious.
• The IMF quota reform negotiated in 
2010 still has to be accepted under 
the rules requiring 85% of the voting 
power to approve it. 
In some cases the reasons for 
paralysis, minimal outcomes or failure to 
reach agreement are structural, as with 
the veto in the UN Security Council, 
and with other bodies where agreements 
require full consensus. But also at play 
in general are the changing geopolitics 
of our times, as the relative power and 
economic balances change, and the 
voice of the south demands to be heard 
as never before. Multilateralism needs 
goodwill and dialogue across groupings 
to be successful, but that is not always to 
be found in abundant quantities. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties, 
the United Nations with its universal 
membership enjoys enormous legitimacy 
and continues to have great convening 
power. In late September, more than 
100 heads of state or government and 
70 deputy prime ministers or ministers 
participated in the general debate of the 
67th UN General Assembly. High-level 
meetings, formal and informal, were 
convened on a wide range of pressing 
issues, from the food and security crisis 
in the Sahel to events in Somalia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria 
and Yemen, and on important areas in 
development such as expanding the rule 
of law, achieving education for all, scaling 
up nutrition and preventing maternal 
deaths.
 In his closing remarks in the general 
debate, the president of the General 
Assembly noted that ‘this Organization 
will only be as strong as the membership 
chooses to make it’. 
The UN membership, of course, 
is composed of member states, while 
the UN charter begins with the words: 
‘We the Peoples’. Increasingly the UN’s 
secretariat, agencies, funds, programmes 
and treaty bodies are interacting directly 
with civil society networks and private 
sector organisations with a shared vision 
for what a better world could be. These 
non-state actors can also be powerful 
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voices in moving global agendas forward, 
including, perhaps, in the future on 
reform of global governance institutions. 
Let me now discuss some of the 
multilateral institutions and processes 
in a little more detail, looking at where 
reform could usefully occur, and at where 
it already has with some success. 
 The United Nations Security Council
The conflict in Syria and the stalemate in 
the Security Council over how to address 
it make the issue of reform of the UN 
Security Council a timely one. Around 
the world people are exposed to media 
reporting of the human toll of the Syrian 
crisis, and are asking why the UN cannot 
act to protect innocent civilians. The same 
questions were asked about the inability 
of UN peacekeeping missions to act in 
Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s.
Discussion on reform of the Security 
Council has proceeded in fits and starts 
for years, with a focus on two issues: 
the out-of-date membership structure; 
and the question of the veto held by 
the five permanent members, which is 
a key concern in relation to decision-
making now over Syria. New Zealand 
opposed the veto power from the time 
of the writing of the UN charter. At the 
General Assembly in September this 
year, the minister of foreign affairs called 
on the five permanent members of the 
Security Council to accept restrictions 
on the use of the veto voluntarily, noting 
that it was originally intended only for 
the protection of vital national interests. 
Murray McCully was one among many 
at the general debate this year who 
highlighted the importance of ongoing 
revitalisation of the UN, including reform 
of the Security Council, for the future 
credibility of the organisation. 
It is seldom that those holding power 
voluntarily cede it, which has always 
made reform of the veto power a tall 
order. Discussion on the expansion of the 
Security Council so that it reflects today’s 
geopolitics, however, could make more 
progress. New Zealand itself is seeking 
a non-permanent seat on the Security 
Council for 2015-16. The elections for 
these seats are hard fought, because of 
the desire of many member states to play 
a role in the UN’s most powerful organ. 
That organ could be more effective with 
reform.
That reform, when it comes, needs to 
be designed for flexibility, so that 20 years 
from now the global community will not 
need to repeat the current discussion 
about the council not representing 
geopolitical realities. 
The Human Rights Council
An example of a successful UN reform 
in my view has been the creation of the 
Human Rights Council. It replaced the 
60-year-old Human Rights Commission, 
which had suffered from a lack of 
credibility. The new, smaller Human 
Rights Council introduced the Universal 
Periodic Review as a mechanism for peer 
review of the state of human rights in 
member states. All member states report 
to the council accordingly, and the views 
of non-state actors are heard. The UNDP 
has played a role in supporting countries 
to prepare their reports and to follow 
up on the recommendations made by 
the council. This mechanism is having 
a positive impact on upholding human 
rights. 
Institutions of financial and economic 
governance 
The global financial crisis of the past 
four years has highlighted the absence of 
credible and strong global mechanisms 
for coordination of responses. In this 
vacuum, the pre-existing G20, designed 
for finance ministers and central bankers, 
was ‘upgraded’ to a higher level when 
President George W. Bush called for a 
meeting of G20 leaders for the first time 
in 2008. While the G20 is an informal 
intergovernmental grouping, any summit 
exclusive to leaders of many of the 
world’s leading economies is of global 
interest. From the outset, therefore, the 
G20 faced challenges, as others affected 
by agreements it reached lacked a direct 
voice in the decision-making. A Global 
Governance Group (3G) was convened by 
Singapore in New York to express the views 
of smaller states about how to engage with 
the G20 (Chowdhury, 2010). New Zealand 
is associated with this group.
While it was clear from President 
Obama’s statements at Pittsburg and 
from the related communiqué that the 
G20 nations should see the grouping as 
the premier vehicle for their economic 
coordination, ‘their’ has often been 
dropped in references to the group, 
leading to it being seen as positioning 
itself as the world’s premier vehicle for 
economic coordination. The agreements 
it has reached appear to have come 
close to directing the work of formal 
multilateral institutions which have their 
own governance structures. 
Robert Wade wrote, for example, 
that G20 leaders ‘boldly announced their 
intention to make themselves the global 
economic steering committee’ (Wade, 
2011, p.355). He points to the communiqué 
of the second summit (London, April 
2009), in which G20 leaders stated that:
We are determined to reform and 
modernize the international financial 
institutions to ensure they can assist 
members and shareholders effectively 
in the new challenges they face. We 
will reform their mandates, scope, 
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and governance to reflect changes 
in the world economy and the new 
challenges of globalization, and 
that emerging and development 
economies, including the poorest, 
must have greater voice and 
representation.
Leaving aside the irony of the G20 
calling for greater voice and representation 
for the poor, Wade notes that G20 critics 
have questioned what authority G20 
leaders have to supersede the governing 
bodies of the IMF and the World Bank, 
and to not only call for a change in voting 
shares but also to designate, broadly, what 
the details of the change should be. 
Years before the G20 called for reform 
of the Bretton Woods institutions, 
the outcome document of the 
International Conference on Financing 
for Development in Monterrey in 2002 
recognised important efforts to reform 
the international financial architecture, 
and called for more ‘transparency and 
the effective participation of developing 
countries and countries with economies 
in transition’ (United Nations, 2002). This 
was echoed at the 2009 United Nations 
Conference on the World Financial 
and Economic Crisis and its Impact on 
Development.
In 2010 both the IMF and the 
World Bank agreed on reforms to their 
governance structures to make the 
organisations more fit-for-purpose in 
the 21st century. For the IMF, the reforms 
agreed include a shift of 6% in quota 
shares from over-represented countries 
to under-represented member countries, 
including dynamic emerging market and 
developing countries. This will have the 
effect, when implemented, of placing 
Brazil, China, India and Russia for the 
first time all among the top ten IMF 
shareholders. 
The US alone has accounted for 
around 17% of votes at the fund. It has 
been the only single country to have 
effective veto power on all major IMF 
decisions, including on approval of the 
quota reform which requires 85% of the 
total voting power to be reached. Some 
have suggested that the US election 
campaign has accounted for the delay in 
completing the IMF reform; if so, there 
will be an expectation that the reform 
moves forward soon. 
The US shareholding does not change 
significantly with the reform, as it would 
keep its veto power. Rather, it is the 
European Union member states who are 
mainly losing shares and seats at the IMF 
executive board.
For the World Bank, reforms in 2010 
expanded on previous reforms agreed 
upon in 2008. These relate not only to 
increasing voice and participation, but 
also to increasing transparency and access 
to information, promoting accountability 
and good governance, improving risk 
management, and reviewing internal 
governance.
The G20 also spurred the creation of 
the Financial Stability Board, following 
the 2009 London Summit, where they 
agreed to ‘establish a new Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) with a strengthened 
mandate, as a successor to the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF), including all G20 
countries, FSF members, Spain, and 
the European Commission’. At the G20 
Los Cabos Summit in June 2012 leaders 
endorsed the recommendations and the 
revised charter of the Financial Stability 
Board, which includes strengthened 
governance, greater financial autonomy 
and enhanced capacity to coordinate 
the development and implementation of 
financial regulatory policies. 
Countries of the south have also called 
for the UN to have a strengthened role in 
global economic governance, including 
through a more robust Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) and better 
coordination between the UN, the Bretton 
Woods institutions and the G20. 
The Economic and Social Council and 
new governance structures for sustainable 
development
In 2005, then UN secretary-general 
Kofi Annan issued a report, In Larger 
Freedom: towards development, security, 
and human rights for all (UN Secretary 
General, 2005), in which he highlighted 
the need for reform to strengthen the 
UN system, including ECOSOC. There 
he proposed the establishment of annual 
ministerial review (AMR) assessments 
of progress towards agreed development 
goals, particularly the millennium 
development goals, and the high-level 
Development Cooperation Forum 
(DCF) as new, formalised mechanisms 
of ECOSOC. Following the 2005 World 
Summit in New York, the UN General 
Assembly adopted resolution 61/16 on 
the ‘Strengthening of the Economic and 
Social Council’, recognising ECOSOC 
as a ‘principal body for coordination, 
policy review, policy dialogue, and 
recommendations on issues of economic 
and social development’, and mandating 
the AMR and the DCF.
Both of these mechanisms, launched 
in 2007, have given ECOSOC greater 
weight: the former raising the level of 
debate on international development 
to the ministerial level, and the latter 
ensuring that a broad range of actors can 
engage with each other in a high-level 
dialogue on development cooperation.
As a UN platform, the DCF has been 
viewed as more inclusive than the aid 
effectiveness forums associated with 
the OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC). But now those 
OECD-associated forums are also 
being transformed with the outcome 
It is depressing, yet at the 
same time encouraging, 
that the dynamism 
around sustainable 
development at Rio+20 
was coming for the 
most part from sub-
national governments, 
NGOs and civil society, 
and the private sector, 
notwithstanding some 
impressive actions 
by individual member 
states.
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of the fourth High Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness, which took place 
in Busan, and the launching of the 
Global Partnership for Development 
Effectiveness. It aims to provide a new 
platform for dialogue between the 
DAC donors and developing countries, 
including the south-south development 
cooperation partners.
Along with the reform of ECOSOC, 
agreement was reached at Rio+20 
to establish a universal membership, 
intergovernmental, high-level political 
forum for sustainable development at 
the UN. It should build on the strengths, 
experiences, resources and inclusive ways 
of working of the current Commission 
on Sustainable Development, which it 
would replace. An intergovernmental 
process will define the features of the new 
forum, which is expected to convene at 
the beginning of the 68th session of the 
General Assembly in September 2013.
The UNDP advocated in the lead-
up to Rio+20 for a new Sustainable 
Development Council, either to replace 
ECOSOC or as a stronger subsidiary 
body to it than the existing commission 
has been. We believed that it could 
benefit from having a peer review 
mechanism, to encourage countries to act 
on sustainable development in line with 
the commitments they make.
This is a question of relevance and 
effectiveness. The collective of member 
states is making too little progress on 
ensuring the future sustainability of 
our world’s ecosystems. Fine words in 
outcome documents need to lead to 
action. It is depressing, yet at the same 
time encouraging, that the dynamism 
around sustainable development at 
Rio+20 was coming for the most part 
from sub-national governments, NGOs 
and civil society, and the private sector, 
notwithstanding some impressive actions 
by individual member states. That is why 
it is becoming so important for the voices 
of non-state actors to be heard in global 
governance forums.
 Global climate governance 
One of the most visible 21st-century 
challenges is that of climate change. 
Coordinated action to combat global 
warming is badly needed, and the risks 
from failing to tackle the problem 
effectively are high. 
Multilateral action centres on the 1992 
United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and its associated 
Kyoto Protocol (1997), both of which 
have been ratified by almost all nations. 
The Bali Roadmap from COP-13 in 
2007 and the Durban Platform from 
COP-17 last year have attempted to set 
firm timelines for reaching agreement 
on further measures for a new global 
agreement. Negotiations have been far 
from smooth, with many items over the 
years postponed for consideration at 
future sessions, and climate negotiations 
often seeming to fail or be held hostage to 
a myriad of interests and positioning. As 
with a WTO round, consensus is required 
for decisions to be reached, or at least 
near consensus as established at Cancun. 
To any casual observer the negotiations 
seem protracted, while the need for action 
becomes ever more pressing. It would be 
a tragedy for future generations if today’s 
leaders and decision-makers prove 
incapable of taking the bold decisions 
which are necessary to stop catastrophic 
and irreversible change to the world’s 
climate. 
The limited accountability 
mechanisms available for agreements 
reached and the lack of meaningful 
consequences for non-compliance have 
also been raised as obstacles to progress 
on a new climate agreement. Another 
concern around the global climate change 
architecture is that of fragmentation. Both 
within the UN and beyond there are a 
number of new institutional mechanisms 
and platforms for negotiation. Critics 
of this fragmentation have argued 
that agreements reached by only 
some countries are inherently flawed. 
Meanwhile, at the sub-national level of 
governance we see useful developments 
– for example, with cities cooperating 
as part of the C-40 network to bring 
about local change through policies for 
transportation and urban planning which 
will both reduce emissions and encourage 
adaptation to the climate change already 
affecting our lives. 
Also, there is room for optimism 
associated with the expected large 
increase in the volume of climate finance 
available. Some of the $US10 billion per 
year which developed countries pledged 
at Copenhagen for low-emissions and 
climate resilient development from 2010 
to 2012 has been delivered. Developed 
countries have committed to raising 
$US100 billion in climate finance annually 
by 2020. That would create an even larger 
base from which to leverage large-scale 
private investment for climate change 
adaptation and mitigation in developing 
countries. 
The UNDP has long supported 
countries to overcome barriers to 
attracting investment. We are now 
applying this experience to help countries 
build the capacities necessary to access 
climate finance and navigate through 
the plethora of diverse funding sources. 
Overall, climate finance is now accessible 
through more than 50 international 
public funds, 60 carbon markets and 
60,000 private equity funds. Without 
strengthened capacities too many localities 
and countries will be left out, unable to tap 
the upfront resources needed to leverage 
private investment and put sustainable 
development into practice.
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Conclusion
In providing a detailed account of some of 
the successful, and at times less successful, 
reform efforts of multilateral institutions 
and processes, I have considered different 
elements which I believe are essential to 
make global governance institutions fit-
for-purpose in the 21st century.
• First, efficiency and effectiveness: I 
have argued that global institutions 
are critical for coordinated action to 
tackle the most pressing challenges 
of our era, whether they be climate 
change, peace and security, or 
economic volatility. Outdated 
structures and functions, such as 
the UN Security Council veto, can 
undermine efficient and effective 
cooperation. 
• Second, legitimacy and transparency: 
I have suggested that much more 
can be done to ensure that global 
institutions are representative and 
inclusive, and that they function 
in a manner which reflects the 
geopolitical realities and economic 
dynamics of the 21st century. The 
ongoing reforms at the IMF, the 
World Bank and other institutions 
are moving in the right direction 
for greater inclusiveness and 
transparency. A reformed ECOSOC 
which attracted finance ministers to 
its proceedings would also give the 
UN a more effective forum and voice 
on economic and financial issues. 
• Finally, accountability and fairness. 
Here the key question is whether 
global institutions give voice and 
decision-making power to those most 
affected by global challenges – often 
the poorest and most vulnerable – 
and whether recipients of support 
are enabled to hold these institutions 
to account. Not enough attention 
is being given to these issues, but 
increasingly global civil society will 
demand that reform agendas take 
them into account.
Overall, there can be no doubt that 
progress has been made towards enabling 
global institutions to be more fit-for-
purpose. So far, however, not enough has 
been done across the three dimensions 
I have outlined to ensure optimal 
functioning of a range of institutions at 
a time when unprecedented cross-border 
challenges require improved global 
governance. 
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